- Capa comum: 463 páginas
- Editora: Princeton University Press; Edição: Reprint (7 de setembro de 2011)
- Idioma: Inglês
- ISBN-10: 0691152640
- ISBN-13: 978-0691152646
- Dimensões do produto: 14 x 3,8 x 21,6 cm
- Peso de envio: 499 g
- Avaliação média: 1 avaliação de cliente
- Lista de mais vendidos da Amazon: no. 65,794 em Livros (Conheça o Top 100 na categoria Livros)
This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Inglês) Capa Comum – 6 set 2011
|Novo a partir de||Usado a partir de|
|Prazo||Valor Mensal (R$)||Total (R$)|
|2x sem juros||R$ 30,78||R$ 61,55|
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Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned.
Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts--as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur.
An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps.
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This highly lauded book is considered one of the most important to address the 2008 financial crisis, or "The Second Great Contraction" as Rogoff and Reinhart have coined it.
"This Time Is Different" is unique from other books that have explored financial booms and busts.
What sets this account apart from its finest predecessors is the scope of the data underlying its central findings. "Our aim here is to be expansive, systematic, and quantitative...earlier works take an essentially narrative approach, fortified by relatively sparse data," argues Rogoff and Reinhart in the opening of their book.
And they do present an impressive breadth of data; and alarmingly, their data indeed makes a strong argument that history does, and likely will continue to, repeat itself.
Equally alarming is the lack of prescriptions the authors put forward to address the "The Second Great Contraction".
At the time this book came out, the narrative that Reinhart and Rogoff use to explain what caused the crisis was well represented and certainly not unique to these authors:
"...financial liberalization simultaneously facilitates banks' access to external credit and more risky lending practices at home. After a while, following a boom in lending and asset prices, weaknesses in bank balance sheets become manifest and problems in the banking sector begin."
Through the authors' recounting of history, we see this narrative- regarding the causes of crises- is a familiar pattern of economic activity across countries and time.
The next part of the story is too, but it is the part of the story that in 2009 pundits were not, and to some degree still are not, recognizing could happen again, and to us:
"The next phase of the crisis unfolds when the central bank begins to provide support for [failed banks] by extending credit to them."
"If the exchange rate is heavily managed," which the US Dollar essentially is through the Fed's mandate to maintain stable prices, "...a policy inconsistency arises between supporting the exchange rate and acting as lender of last resort to troubled institutions...the exchange rate is subjugated to the role of the central bank as the lender of last resort..."
"The depreciation or devaluation of the currency...exacerbates the problem of the banks that have borrowed in a foreign currency..." It "usually worsens inflation...and it increases the odds of external and domestic default if the government has foreign currency denominated debt."
In other words, the goal of stable prices and of correcting a banking crisis like "The Second Great Contraction" come in direct conflict. Throughout history, the result of this conflict has most typically been inflation followed by default on domestic or external debt, or some combination of the two. The type of default usually depending on the said country's history of default and their mix of debt.
This time is decidedly not different. The cycles of boom and bust that Rogoff and Reinhart have painstakingly recorded in this book seem to be playing out yet again.
History inevitably repeats itself, and for no reason I suppose other than because of humanity's desire to pretend it doesn't.
The question after you read this book is not whether or not this time is different; the question is what do to solve the problems that arise when history inevitably does repeat itself. It seems to much to ask, based on human nature, to actually prevent these recurrences from ever happening.
I had hoped to derive useful insights for investing. I have read other books - The Big Short, Dying of Money, Lords of Finance, etc. - with this same purpose. However, while I was greatly impressed with the authors' effort and commitment, the main lesson that I drew from the book is that financial distress is quite common and recovery from it can be painful and lengthy. I expect our recovery to be so.
The book may aid an investor if one invests overseas. The historical tendencies of individual countries may be of some use. An investor may avoid some countries because of their financial history. For instance, if one loans money to Argentina or Greece with an expectation of repayment, you are quite likely to get what you deserve.
The book notes that inflation is one common political response to national financial distress. Indeed, I have read a blog by Professor Rogoff observing that the United States' current overcommitted financial circumstances might be eased by inflation. This, too, probably lies in our future. The book, Dying of Money, about the German hyperinflation of the 1920's may provide some practical guidance on this point.